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PREPOSITIONS IN THE  
CONSTITUTION 
Erik M. Jensen† 
N MY RECENT WORK I’ve had occasion to contemplate the im-
portance of prepositions in the Constitution. It’s not a prepos-
terous proposition to postulate that prepositions should have 
effect, as should all other words in a legal document. But the 
lowly preposition, always linked in my mind to rabbits and hollow 
logs,1 has not been given the respect it deserves in interpretive mat-
ters. 
In the Tonnage Clause, the Constitution precludes states from 
imposing “duties of tonnage” without congressional approval.2 “Ton-
nage” was understood historically to refer to the capacity of mari-
time vessels, and states weren’t supposed to be levying duties that 
would interfere with federal regulation of interstate and foreign 
commerce.3 
                                                                                                 
† Erik Jensen is the David L. Brennan Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University. 
1 As I was taught in elementary school, a rabbit can go on the hollow log, around it, 
through it, over it, and so on. Hare-splitting purists might sputter that the bunny 
idea doesn’t work with some prepositions, like “of,” but to me that complaint 
rings hollow. 
2 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (providing that “[n]o State shall, without the consent 
of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage”). 
3 See Erik M. Jensen, Quirky Constitutional Provisions Matter: The Tonnage 
Clause, Polar Tankers, and State Taxation of Commerce, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
no. 3 (2011) (forthcoming) (arguing that Tonnage Clause raises a boatload of 
I 
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Long ago the Supreme Court concluded that at least some state 
levies not expressed in terms of vessels’ capacities – not explicitly 
tied, that is, to “tonnage” – were still forbidden by the Tonnage 
Clause. If that weren’t the case, it would be too easy for states to 
circumvent the Clause: A state could measure the amount of tax 
liability on a vessel using its ports by the number of masts, say, ra-
ther than capacity. Indeed, the Court concluded that a fixed levy on 
vessels using a state’s ports – a charge not even remotely tied to 
vessels’ capacities – could have results that the Tonnage Clause was 
intended to prevent.4 
If the Tonnage Clause is to have effect, the Court’s position 
makes sense. But constitutional and statutory language does not 
have to lead to sensible results. Does the Court’s interpretation 
comport with the language of the Clause? I think it does, when we 
focus on the preposition. The Clause forbids duties of tonnage.5 A 
duty on tonnage (i.e., one measured by capacity or a reasonable sur-
rogate therefor) may be a duty of tonnage, but the latter category 
can be far broader. Understood in that way, the constitutional 
phrase describes the nature of the generally proscribed levy, with its 
emphasis on maritime vessels,6 not the measure of the levy. The 
language of the Clause supports the purpose of the Clause, which is 
as things should be in a ship-shape world. 
You go, prepo! 
                                                                                                 
issues). The Tonnage Clause received its most recent Supreme Court considera-
tion in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009). 
4 See Jensen, supra note 3, at Part IV.A (discussing the many relevant cases, which I 
would cite here except that doing so would make it hard to fit this article on these 
tiny, low-tonnage pages). 
5 Commentators sometimes mix up prepositions. See, e.g., Francis Hilliard, The 
Law of Taxation 64 (1875) (referring to “duties on tonnage,” as if the preposition 
mattered not a whit). 
6 One question today is whether the Clause might also prohibit similar levies 
imposed on other means of transportation – aircraft, say – entering a state. See 
Jensen, supra note 3, at Part IV.A (arguing that the answer should be Yes, if we 
look to the purpose of the Clause or, in the alternative, if we apply the plane-
meaning rule). 
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The clipper ship Great Republic: “Length on deck 325 feet. – Breadth of beam 53 
feet. – Depth of hold 39 feet. – Tonnage per register 4500.” By Currier & Ives (ca. 
1835-1856). 
_________________________________________________ 
Another example of prepositions’ possible preeminence can be 
found in discussions as to whether the individual-mandate penalty in 
the recently enacted health-care legislation – beginning in 2014, 
most Americans must acquire health care coverage or pay a penalty 
– might be a direct tax and, if it will be, whether it would be ex-
empted from the direct-tax apportionment rule7 by the Sixteenth 
Amendment, which refers to “taxes on incomes.”8 
                                                                                                 
7 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No 
Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census 
or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
8 U.S. Const. amend. XVI (exempting “taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived,” from the apportionment requirement). For what it’s worth, I don’t 
think the penalty will be a tax to begin with, and the constitutionality of the indi-
vidual mandate should be analyzed only under the Commerce Clause, not the 
Taxing Clause. But, as an alternative argument, the Obama administration is de-
fending the individual mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, see U.S. Const. 
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Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,9 
the penalty for anyone who doesn’t acquire “minimum essential 
coverage,” and who is not exempted from these rules (as, for exam-
ple, low-income people will be), will be one of three figures: A 
fixed dollar figure will set the floor (to be $695 in 2016). A per-
centage-of-income figure will come into play if it is higher than the 
floor (the rate to be 2.5% in 2016),10 but subject to a cap based on 
the average national cost of so-called “bronze level coverage” – 
meaning decent, but not lavish, health insurance.11 
If the penalty will be a direct tax, it will be subject to the oner-
ous direct-tax apportionment rule of the Constitution, generally 
requiring that the direct-tax liability be apportioned among the 
states on the basis of the respective states’ populations, without re-
gard to how the tax base (in this case, the population without ade-
quate insurance) is distributed across the country.12 If the penalty 
has to be apportioned, it could not work in the intended way.13 In 
                                                                                                 
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises”), and the administration’s position brings these taxing issues 
into play. For extended discussion of all of this stuff, see Erik M. Jensen, The 
Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. No. 3 (2011) 
(symposium issue) (forthcoming). 
9 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-49 (2010) (as if you’re really 
going to check out Statutes at Large after seeing this reference in the Bag). 
10 I’m ignoring some details here, such as the content of the category I have called 
“income.” For present purposes, it’s good enough to understand the concept in a 
commonsense way and to assume that what goes into the penalty calculation 
would be treated as “income” under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
11 I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(1)-(c)(3). “Bronze level coverage” has nothing to do with the 
simultaneously enacted excise on persons for whom “indoor tanning services” are 
performed, see I.R.C. § 5000B, a tax generally understood to have been directed 
at John Boehner. 
12 See supra note 7 (quoting the Direct-Tax Clauses). 
13 Suppose two states with identical populations have vastly different numbers of un- 
or under-insured people. Regardless of that difference, the total penalty to be 
collected from the two states will have to be the same if the penalty will be a di-
rect tax and will not be a “tax on incomes.” That would be a crazy result. This 
illustrates how the apportionment rule, clearly intended to deter direct taxation, 
makes it unlikely that an openly direct tax will ever again be enacted. 
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any event, the penalty as enacted will not be apportioned and, if it 
will be a direct tax, it will therefore be unconstitutional in its pre-
sent form, unless . . . . 
The possible unless is the Sixteenth Amendment, which made the 
modern, unapportioned income tax possible. If the penalty will be a 
“tax on incomes” – yes, the preposition is important – the penalty 
need not be apportioned, even if it would otherwise be a direct 
tax.14 
Some commentators have argued that the percentage-of-income 
calculation described earlier will make the penalty an income tax. 
And, because some low-income persons will be exempted from the 
penalty, income will help determine who will be subject to the pen-
alty, also supporting the idea (it is argued) that the penalty, if it will 
be a tax at all, will be an income tax.15 
I concede (as I have to) that income computations will be neces-
sary to determine the amount of any penalty for un- or under-
insured persons, and to determine whether someone will be subject 
to the penalty to begin with. Call that an “income tax,” if you 
wish.16 But think about how liability will be computed: someone 
with annual income of $1 billion who does not acquire suitable in-
surance will pay exactly the same penalty, the cap – the cost of 
bronze level coverage – as someone with one-one thousandth of that 
income.17 Can one say that a tax which hits lower-income folks as 
hard as higher-income ones is a tax on incomes? (Remember – if you 
                                                                                                 
14 See supra note 8 (quoting relevant part of Sixteenth Amendment). 
15 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, 128 Tax Notes 755, 760 
(2010); Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health 
Care Reform, 120 Yale L.J. Online 27, 31 (2010). 
16 Some have wished. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 15, at 760 (seeing the opera-
tion of the individual-mandate penalty as equivalent to “[i]mposing mandatory 
government collections calculated as a percentage of household income, [which] is 
exactly how an income tax operates”). 
17 I could make the fraction even smaller to support the point, but I wanted to make 
sure I was using numbers that result in a percentage-of-income figure far above 
any reasonable estimate of what the cost of bronze level coverage might be. (I 
certainly hope that 2.5% of $1 million (i.e., $25,000) meets that criterion.) 
Erik M. Jensen 
168 14 GREEN BAG 2D 
could possibly forget after reading this far – that the language in the 
Amendment is “taxes on incomes,” not “income tax.”) One might 
think – indeed, I do think – that a tax on incomes must impose high-
er absolute liability as income rises18 (just as a duty on tonnage 
would be higher for a high-capacity vessel than a low-capacity 
one).19 To the extent that doesn’t happen, you don’t have a tax on 
incomes, even if income plays a role in the calculations.20 A cap 
doesn’t fit with the idea of a tax on incomes, at least for those sub-
ject to the cap.21 
As was the case with the Tonnage Clause, the preposition in the 
Sixteenth Amendment – taxes on incomes22 – has real meaning, and 
the language supports the purpose of the provision. The move for an 
income tax in the late nineteenth century, temporarily stalled by the 
Supreme Court’s 1895 decisions in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co.,23 but rejuvenated by ratification of the Amendment in 1913, 
was intended to make the wealthy bear their fair share of the nation-
al tax liability. That had not been true when the nation relied on 
consumption taxes like tariffs for revenue. It would turn the 
                                                                                                 
18 I’m not talking progressivity here. A proportional tax – with the same rate on all 
income – still results in a higher absolute income-tax liability for higher-income 
persons. For that matter, a regressive income tax, with rates declining at higher 
levels, will result in higher taxes for higher-income folks as long as the marginal 
rate does not reach zero. 
19 As noted earlier, however, the Tonnage Clause generally forbids state duties of 
tonnage, thus picking up more than duties on tonnage. 
20 I have also argued that exempting really low-income people from a tax isn’t 
enough to make the tax into one on incomes. That conception would make al-
most all levies into taxes on incomes, and the proponents and ratifiers of the Six-
teenth Amendment didn’t think they were abolishing the direct-tax apportion-
ment rule. See Jensen, supra note 8, at Part III.C. 
21 At the other extreme, those whose penalty will be the floor, the fixed dollar 
figure, also don’t seem to be subject to a tax on incomes, however that phrase 
might be interpreted. 
22 Have I italicized “on” enough times yet? Maybe I’ll do it once more. 
23 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (striking down 1894 income tax on 
the ground that it was an unapportioned direct tax, at least insofar as it reached 
income from property). 
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Amendment on its head to conclude that a tax which does not im-
pose higher liability on higher-income people would still be on in-
comes. 
It’s nice when language and goals coincide. And, at least occa-
sionally, prepositions help us get to that happy result. 
 
 
 
 
